In this study, we investigate the role of board members in German squeeze-out transactions by applying the event study methodology. We find that a dismissal of a management board member is associated with lower cumulative abnormal returns in the period of three months preceding the squeeze-out announcement. This indicates that minority shareholders receive a lower compensation if management board members are dismissed prior to the squeeze-out announcement. Though we are cautious to draw inferences from this finding, we follow other scholars (e.g., Daske et al., 2010) and suggest that majority shareholders exploit their superior status and use its power opportunistically. We furthermore explore the effects of directors' dealings in a squeeze-out transaction. We find that if stock purchases take place in a period of one year preceding the announcement, abnormal returns tend to be lower in the run-up period and higher on the announcement date.
Introduction
German law gives majority shareholders the option to squeeze out minority shareholders once they own more than 95% of the share capital of a stock corporation. Majority shareholders are required to reimburse the minority shareholders by paying them a fair compensation. Notably, the reimbursement has to fully compensate the loss of the rights associated with the shares and thus reflect the fair market value of the company (Müller-Michaelis, 2011; van der Elst and van den Steen, 2009 ). For listed entities, the compensation cannot be lower than the weighted average stock price of the three months preceding the squeeze-out announcement. However, the law permits exemptions from this requirement only if the stock price does not represent the fair market value of the entity. German jurisprudence recognises this instance if stock prices are manipulated (BGH, 2001) .
Prior literature acknowledges that this three month run-up period to the announcement is of particular interest since both parties involved have incentives to influence the average stock price to their advantage (Burger, 2012; Daske et al., 2010; Elsland and Weber, 2005) . While the options of the minority shareholders are rather limited, majority shareholders have access to private information on the target since they are able to designate at least 50% of the mandates of the supervisory board. Hence, the supervisory board designates the management board, majority shareholders are also able to govern the corporate policy of the target (Toll and Benda, 2014) . Given these assumptions, measures taken by the target company are driven by the intentions of the majority shareholders.
We investigate whether the dismissal of a supervisory or management board member, as part of majority shareholders' opportunities to influence a target company's corporate policy, has an impact on the average stock price that reflects the lower limit for the compensation of the minority shareholders. Additionally, we control for the event of directors' dealings that take place one year preceding the squeeze-out announcement and link these to the relevant period.
We find that a dismissal of a management board member is associated with lower cumulative abnormal returns in the period of three months preceding the squeeze-out announcement. This indicates that minority shareholders receive lower compensation if management board members are dismissed prior to the squeeze-out announcement. We are cautious to draw inferences from this finding; however, as already argued by other scholars (Burger, 2012; Daske et al., 2010) , we suggest that majority shareholders exploit their superior status and use its power opportunistically to lower the target's stock prices in the period prior to the squeeze-out announcement. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess possible manipulation, we argue that in cases of management board member dismissals, the average stock cannot be a suitable measure for the compensation. We cannot find any connection between the dismissal of a supervisory board member and cumulative abnormal stock returns for three months preceding the squeeze-out announcement.
Furthermore, we find negative cumulative abnormal returns in the run-up period if directors purchase the target's stocks within one year prior to the announcement. However, the connection appears to be weak. We suggest that directors could buy stocks in the run-up period to the announcement at a comparatively low price to generate returns and thereby receive a high compensation afterwards. However, we are aware of that these inferences have to be drawn carefully.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss literature that relates to our research question. Section 3 develops our research hypothesis. Section 4 describes our approach to hypothesis testing and Section 5 presents some descriptive statistics as well as the results from the event study and cross-sectional analyses. Section 6 concludes and discusses the implications.
Stock performance and squeeze-out transactions
Since the implementation of the squeeze-out option in the German Stock Corporation Act [Aktiengesetzt (AktG)], scholars have explored the effects of squeeze-out announcements. Table 1 summarises the findings of those (event) studies. Undisputedly and in general, prior literature finds that a squeeze-out announcement is associated with significant positive (cumulative) abnormal returns, both on the announcement date and in the run-up period.
Scholars argue that on the announcement date significant positive abnormal returns arise due to information asymmetries in the market. Because compensations usually exceed stock prices and may even be increased in subsequent appraisal procedures, the squeeze-out announcement reveals new information to markets and causes positive abnormal returns (Eisele and Walter, 2006; Elsland and Weber, 2005) . This view is confirmed by Daske et al. (2010) , who find the highest positive abnormal return on the date of the squeeze-out announcement if companies pursue a passive information policy prior to a squeeze-out announcement. Thus, less public information in the run-up period to the squeeze-out announcement is associated with higher information asymmetries and eventually associated with a higher adjustment in terms of abnormal returns on the announcement date. Consistent with this view, Elsland and Weber (2005) find abnormal returns to be lower if the target concluded a control and profit transfer agreement or received an offer according to the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act [Wertpapiererwerbs-und Übernahmegesetzt (WpÜG) ] in the period preceding the squeeze-out announcement. As in both types of corporate transaction a market value is assigned to the target shares, market participants can assess the value of the shares in the run-up period to the squeeze-out announcement more precisely so that, on the date of the squeeze-out announcement, less adjustment is needed.
Generally, in the run-up period, cumulative abnormal returns also tend to be significantly positive. On the one hand, prior literature finds that a small portion of overall cumulative abnormal returns can be associated with available information prior to the squeeze-out. Stated differently, investors base their investment decision in squeeze-out companies on speculation rather than on actual fundamental company data. In fact, an active market exists that focuses on squeeze-out transactions (Daske et al., 2010) . On the other hand, Daske et al. argue that majority shareholders act rationally and try to push stock prices downwards. Squeeze-out companies change the tone of their press releases prior to the announcement and thereby influence stock prices negatively. However, the impact on abnormal returns is rather minor.
Hypotheses development
A type of measure that we observe prior to a squeeze-out announcement is the dismissal of a supervisory or management board member. Prior literature shows that a management turnover typically sends negative signals to the market and thereby impacts stock returns (Reinganum, 1985; Warner et al., 1988) . If a dismissal or a turnover lies in the run-up period to the squeeze-out announcement, stock returns and eventually the compensation are lowered. In some cases, the dismissal can also have a negative long-term effect on stock returns (Denis and Denis, 1995) . Grigoleit (2011) measures abnormal returns for the specific case where a former CEO becomes the chairman of the supervisory board. However, we are not aware of any literature that explores the effects of a dismissal of a supervisory board member in general. We assume that the same effects should be observable for a dismissal of a supervisory board. Therefore, we hypothesise:
H1a A dismissal of a member of the management board is associated with negative abnormal returns in a squeeze-out transaction.
H1b A dismissal of a member of the supervisory board is associated with negative abnormal returns in a squeeze-out transaction.
Another feature of a squeeze-out transaction that we observe is directors' dealings. Again, if directors' dealings lie in the run-up period to the announcement, these could impact abnormal returns. If this feature impacts abnormal returns, the average stock price may not be suitable for the calculation of the compensation. Management and supervisory board members have superior information about the squeeze-out so that stocks can be purchased at a comparatively low price. Prior literature finds a positive association between stock purchases and abnormal returns. However, the impact of sales of stocks is unclear (Fidrmuc et al., 2006) . Also, research finds no indication for the information hierarchy hypothesis, so the impact on abnormal returns does not differ across dealings with supervisory and management board members in Germany (Betzer and Theissen, 2009 ). We therefore state for the second hypothesis:
H2 Directors' dealings that take place prior to a squeeze-out announcement impact cumulative abnormal stock returns.
Methodology

Sample selection
This study is based on the Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger e. V. (SdK) website, which provides an overview of squeeze-outs conducted between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2012. According to this database, 334 transactions took place during this time.
We define a squeeze-out transaction as any share transfer (preferred or common share) that is connected to the squeeze-out. For the purpose of this paper, the event date is defined as the first disclosure by the target company that contains the expression 'squeeze-out'. In general, we use the date of the ad-hoc announcement as the event date. If the announcement cannot be found in ad-hoc portals, we assume the announcement was published on the day of the request, the date which is usually mentioned in the convocation of the general meetings. The collected data indicate that requests are made on average 0.35 days after the respective announcements, supporting the reasonability of the assumption.
Our analyses are based on two samples. Our original sample contains 334 share transfers in connection with a squeeze-out transaction between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 2012. Due to missing announcements, we drop 84 share transfers. Since in a squeeze-out transaction 95% of the shares belong to the majority shareholder, the stocks of the target company are traded infrequently. To account for this, stocks that are traded on fewer than 30 days in the estimation window are eliminated from the sample. This restriction eliminates another 20 shares. As the German government introduced two other squeeze-out types (according to WpHG and according to WpÜG) we cannot assume that both are subjected to the same price formation. Fair compensation is determined differently in these types of transaction. Therefore, we eliminate a further nine share transfers from the sample. The remaining 221 squeeze-outs are referred to henceforth as sample 1.
To ensure that effects are not measured due to misspecification of data, we construct another sample (sample 2) that is restricted to a further three conditions. Since some squeeze-outs are announced twice, we cannot assume that the second announcement is new information for the market. Therefore, we drop the second announcement, which affected nine shares. Some companies in the sample have more than one class (type) of share. In order to ensure comparability of the results, stocks other than ordinary shares are excluded. From a legal point of view, this approach can be justified in that ordinary and preferred stocks typically differ in terms of the amount of compensation (Austmann, 2007) . This eliminates another 14 shares from sample 1. As some announcements were approximated by the date of the request, it cannot be determined whether these are the exact announcement days. Therefore, we exclude another 18 transactions. The remaining 180 shares constitute our sample 2. Table 2 gives an overview of sample 1 and the restrictions applied in order to assemble sample 2. We will analyse the effects introduced in this study using sample 1 and check for robustness using sample 2. 
Event study methodology
We follow the basic procedure of an event study proposed by MacKinlay (1997), which is based on an estimation window and an event window. The event period comprises 106 days, where the pre-event period spans 65 days and the post-announcement period 40 days. The reason for the asymmetric event window is that according to the WpÜG-Angebotsverordnung, the reference period to determine the fair compensation has to be three months prior to the announcement. We apply 65 days to be sure that the relevant period is captured. The post-event period spans 40 days, which eliminates the effects of a stock market reaction to the general meeting (Elsland and Weber, 2005) . The logarithm stock market return is continuously compounded, leading to the following expression:
where p it is the price for stock i on day t and p it-1 is the price one day earlier. 
where E(R i [t] )is the expected return of stock i on day t according to the specified model in (3). As shown earlier, previous research on going private and squeeze-out transactions has relied on the market model. However, multifactor models tend to incorporate firm-specific features (Fama and French, 1993) . According to MacKinlay (1997) , the gains from using multifactor models are greatest when the sample consists of companies with common attributes. In these cases, the variance is considerably reduced. Squeeze-out companies share comparable low market capitalisation. Therefore, to estimate E(R i [t] ) of the squeeze-out announcements, the four-factor model developed by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) French, 1993, 1996) . The calculation of the momentum factor MOM it is done in accordance with Carhart (1997) . The momentum factor in our models with daily data captures the return difference between a portfolio consisting of firms with below median returns in the previous 250 trading days, and a portfolio of firms with above median returns in the previous 250 trading days.
To examine the overall effects of the announcements, we aggregate the AR for time t and across stocks i. 
We test abnormal returns using Brown and Warner's (1985) CDA. Moreover, the rank test according to Corrado (1989) will test the results for robustness. As squeeze-out stocks are thinly traded stocks, we apply the specification to the Corrado rank test proposed by Corrado and Zivney (1992) and Campbell and Wesley (1993) .
Regression model and definition of variables
In the multiple regression analyses, we investigate how the factors proposed in Section 3 jointly impact (C)ARs in the pre-and post-event period, as well as on the event date. The variable CHMAN captures the effect of a management turnover/dismissal. This variable takes the value one if a management change took place within one year prior to the event and zero otherwise. We construct the variable CHSUP according to the previous variable, except that the variable takes the value one if a change in the supervisory board took place within one year prior to the event and zero otherwise. The impact of directors' dealings are captured by the variables DDBUY and DDSELL that take a value of one if directors purchased (sold) stocks within one year prior to the event and zero otherwise. To control for effects that have been raised in previous literature, the variable BENCH takes the value one if a takeover bid took place within one year prior to the event and zero otherwise. The variable ENTER takes the value one if an enterprise agreement exists on the event date and zero otherwise. The variable FREQU takes the value one (high trading volume) if we observe that actual trading takes place on more than nine days in the interval [-5; +5] . Otherwise, the variable takes the value zero. OWNSH takes the value one if the majority shareholder attained the relevant 95% threshold within one year prior to the announcement and zero otherwise.
Furthermore, we introduce the control variable bgh, a time dummy that controls for squeeze-out announcements before and after the fundamental decision of the BGH in 2010. As noted earlier, the BGH ruled in 2001 that the lower boundary of a fair compensation has to represent at least the average stock price three months prior to the general meeting (BGH, 2001 ). This decision caused several uncertainties when it came to the reference period to be applied in order to determine fair compensation. Practitioners and legal experts criticised this decision for two reasons. Firstly, stock prices are heavily influenced by speculation about the offered compensation (as the squeeze-out is already announced), which depends on the stock price, which in turn depends on the compensation offered. Secondly, according to § 327c (2), the compensation offered has to be explained in the convocation of the general meeting, which has to be provided to the minority shareholders six weeks prior to the general meeting. This is impossible because the relevant lower bound of the fair compensation has to be determined on the day of the general meeting, which at that point lies in the future (Müller-Michaelis, 2011) . Practitioners have resolved this obstacle in two ways. Either they published the compensation on a preliminary basis (Austmann, 2007) or they applied a three month period before the announcement. The first became problematic, since it is unlawful to adjust the compensation downwards once it is set. If the final compensation is lower than the one published, the majority shareholder has to offer the higher preliminary compensation. Concerning the second, practitioners disregarded the advice to use the relevant period prior to the general meeting so that the BGH changed its opinion in 2010 concerning the reference period for determining fair compensation. The relevant reference period has to be the three months prior to the announcement of the squeeze-out (BGH, 2010) . Since this decision constitutes a major structural break, it seems reasonable to control for this event
We run OLS regressions on the pre-event period CAR [-65; -1] 
Results
Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 4 provides an overview of the number of transactions in the years in question. Most squeeze-out transactions were conducted within the first years of the introduction of the squeeze-out option. Later, the number of transactions levelled off. Table 4 is an overview of the explanatory variables used, whereas panel C of Table 4 provides key statistics for the control variables. Obs. = number of observations.
Panel B of
Event study analysis and multivariate results
We run the event study on sample 1 and sample 2. In line with prior studies, we find positive significant abnormal performance on the announcement date. Figure 1 illustrates the development of the abnormal returns in the event window. We cannot confirm prior literature's findings of significant cumulative abnormal returns either for the pre-event window or for the post-event period. Cumulative abnormal return climbs to 4.04% for sample 1 and 6.73% for sample 2. Table 5 provides the results for the event study. Notes: *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1%level.
Based on the previous findings, we construct the cross-sectional analysis according to Sub-Section 3. Table 6 provides the results of the performed cross-sectional regression.
In this study, we investigate the role of management in squeeze-out transactions. The variable CHMAN captures the effect of a management turnover on abnormal returns in the event period. We find that the abnormal returns decrease significantly in the pre-event period, namely by 12%, so that for these squeeze-out transactions lower compensations are paid compared to situations where no management changes took place in the run-up. This finding holds true for sample 2. Additionally, sample 2 shows that abnormal returns on the event date decrease significantly if a management turnover took place within one year prior to the announcement, suggesting that the market anticipates squeeze-outs. However, this finding can only be observed at a 10% significance level and only for sample 2. From previous studies that deal with management turnover and its impact on stock prices, we conclude that the turnover has a negative effect even in the specific environment of a squeeze-out. Furthermore, we can infer that a management turnover decreases the average compensation in a squeeze-out transaction. Assuming that a squeeze-out is planned approximately one year prior to the announcement, the management change could be initiated by the majority shareholder on purpose in order to influence stock prices negatively. Even if board members are not dismissed intentionally, it still has a negative impact on the compensation. If these assumptions hold true, the stock prices, at least in cases involving a prior management turnover, do not meet the fairness requirement. In line with this finding, Daske et al. (2010) show that target companies pursue a negative or passive information policy prior to the announcement.
A change in the supervisory board of the target company has no significant influence on abnormal performance. Even though ARs are lower on the announcement day and increase in the pre-event period, both effects are statistically insignificant for both samples. In line with our a priori assumptions, a supervisory board change has no impact on stock performance in the specific environment of a squeeze-out transaction.
We furthermore explore the effects of directors' dealings in a squeeze-out transaction. For both samples, we find that if stock purchases take place in a period of one year preceding the announcement, abnormal returns tend to be lower in the run-up period and higher on the announcement date. This connection, however, appears to be weak, as in the run-up period as well as on the announcement date, the variable DDBUY is significant at the 10% level. The results for the pre-event period indicate that the compensation is lower on average compared to a situation where no directors' dealings take place. The effects observed for the announcement date imply that information asymmetries increase if directors purchase stocks in the run-up to the announcement. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that directors who know about the upcoming squeeze-out may exploit their knowledge and purchase the stocks at a price that is below the intrinsic value of the compensation. If board members pursue such a strategy effectively, they can realise strong returns.
We cannot draw any inferences from cases where board members sell their shares in the run-up to the squeeze-out announcement. In line with prior research, the effects of directors' dealings on stock performance are rather puzzling, even in the specific environment of a squeeze-out transaction.
The variable BENCH that captures the effect of a prior set benchmark in a takeover bid indicates no significant effects in the run-up. Abnormal returns on the announcement date decrease by 4.12% if a takeover bid sets a benchmark prior to the announcement. Consistent with prior studies, this effect indicates that information asymmetries among minority and majority shareholders decrease. As the variable FREQU measures the impact of a high trading volume around the announcement, we conclude in line with prior research that more frequently traded stocks tend to attract more attention, leading to significant anticipation effects. For both samples, the variable is significant at the 10% level.
Contrary to prior literature, we are unable to detect a significant relationship between the existence of an enterprise agreement and stock performance in the event period. Additionally, the variable OWNSH shows ambivalent results. While we can show that abnormal returns increase significantly on the announcement day if the majority shareholder attains the relevant threshold within one year prior to the announcement, this effect cannot be confirmed for sample 2. Table 6 Cross-sectional results
CAR [-65;- Notes: We run the OLS regression with heteroscedasticity consistent sandwich estimators (White, 1980; Huber, 1967) . Robust p-values in parentheses;***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The variable CHMAN captures the effect of a management turnover/dismissal. This variable takes the value 1 if a management change took place within one year prior to the event and 0 otherwise. We construct the variable CHSUP according to the previous variable, except that the variable takes the value 1 if a change in the supervisory board took place within one year prior to the event and 0 otherwise. The impact of directors' dealings is captured by the variables DDBUY and DDSELL that take a value of 1 if directors purchased (sold) stocks within one year prior to the event and 0 otherwise. To control for effects that have been raised in previous literature, the variable BENCH takes the value 1 if a takeover bid took place within one year prior to the event and 0 otherwise. The variable ENTER takes the value 1 if an enterprise agreement exists on the event date and 0 otherwise. The variable FREQU takes the value 1 if a high trading volume can be assumed. Otherwise, the variable takes the value 0. OWNSH takes the value 1 if the majority shareholder attained the relevant threshold within one year prior to the announcement and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, we introduce the control variable bgh, a time dummy that controls for squeeze-out announcements before and after the fundamental decision of the BGH in 2010.
Table 6
Cross-sectional results (continued)
Conclusions and further research areas
In this study, we investigate the role of management in squeeze-out transactions in Germany by applying the event study methodology. We conduct a multiple regression analysis to show that certain features of squeeze-out transactions influence the period relevant for determining the compensation that has to be paid to the minority shareholder. We find that a dismissal of a member of the management board in the run-up period to the squeeze-out announcement impacts abnormal returns. German law, however, requires that the minority shareholders receive full compensation for the loss of their shares. Since majority shareholders are able to govern the business policy of the target, they can exploit their superior position and send negative signals to the market. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess possible manipulation. However, even if board members are not dismissed intentionally, it still has an impact on the compensation. In our view, the fairness of the compensation cannot be assured and stock prices are not a suitable benchmark. Regarding directors' dealings, we suggest that further research is needed to understand their implications. We suggest, however, that board members could exploit their superior knowledge to generate high returns.
Further research on squeeze-out transactions should focus on the manipulation issue, but with a different goal. We agree with prior literature that speculation drives prices up and actions taken by the majority shareholders rather push prices down in the run-up period. However, we know little about what impact this has. Neither our study nor previous studies control for the amount of cases in which the lower limit is actually applied. Additionally, recent legal literature especially raises another concern that supposedly violates the fair compensation constraint -i.e., announcing the squeeze-out at a favourable point in time. This issue should be explored by further empirical research.
